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ABSTRACT
When the SARS virus broke out in Singapore, it posed a challenge to its
crisis managers. The government mobilized its e-government infrastructure as a
platform to manage this crisis. The Defence Science and Technology Agency
(DSTA) provided IT support for contact tracing operations, a key part of
containing the spread of the virus. DSTA developed an information system in two
weeks to manage data and coordinate several agencies. Through a qualitative
case study of DSTA and its role in supporting Singapore’s crisis management, in
this paper, we detail how Singapore deployed its e-government infrastructure in
the face of a national crisis. Crisis management needs an infrastructure for
effective information sharing, and e-governments posses such an infrastructure
with a strong reach across several agencies. The development of Case
Management System (CMS) and its use highlights some user behavior towards
data and new functionality developed to cater to the needs of the crisis. We
suggest that such lessons grounded in Singapore’s experiences provide a useful
direction for developing future crisis management infrastructures.
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INTRODUCTION
In the electronic commerce (ecommerce) era, citizens and business owners
having had increasing exposure to offerings of
the Internet and other digital tools such as
wireless telephony now expect the same
immediacy from one of their most important
and often challenging relationships - with their
government (Ho 2002). From web-based
portals to digital kiosks in public buildings,
governments at all levels are attempting to
provide real time interactive lines of
communication (Layne and Lee 2001). To
support these activities, governments are
investing
in
national
information
infrastructures (Wilson 1997; Nambisan &
Agarwal 1998). These infrastructures provide
the foundation for development of services
that reach several sections of the society for a
variety of purposes (Wilson 1997). Beyond

national
infrastructure
advanced
egovernments provide transactional services
through
integration
across
several
organizations at various stages of egovernment (Moon 2002; Layne and Lee
2001). With extensive infrastructure, egovernments go beyond IT to organizational
routines and processes with embedded
knowledge to help governments maximise
their returns on investments (Wimmer and
Traunmuller 2001).
Singapore invested in information
technologies through a series of infrastructural
development
programmes
within
the
government since the late 1970’s (Gurbaxani
et al. 1991) through coordinated policy
development (Mechling 1994; Ein-Dor, Myers,
and Raman 1997). Through the 1990’s,
Singapore developed its e-government action
plan delivering its services electronically with

CONTRIBUTIONS
This paper discusses the events surrounding the crisis management of SARS outbreak
in Singapore. Singapore’s advanced e-government infrastructure provided an opportunity to
quickly deploy its IT resources to support various crisis related activities. This research
explores the development of e-government infrastructure as more than an electronic service
delivery medium. E-governments have primarily focussed on delivering electronic
transactional services. The events in the case study suggest that e-government infrastructure
can, in addition, serve as a crisis management platform. Crisis management requires
interaction of several agencies, efficient and rapid information exchange, knowledge sharing
and integrated process management to coordinate several activities. E-governments generally
possess extensive IT infrastructure, and can serve as a crisis management platform from which
to coordinate, communicate and share information during a crisis.
Preparing for a crisis, however, is a difficult task due to its random nature. This also
implies the need for an extensive infrastructure that can be used during crises. Towards this
purpose, we contribute to crisis management literature by exploring the use of e-government
infrastructure to support crisis management activities. The case demonstrates the deployment
of IT capabilities which Singapore channelled towards efficient crisis management. This paper
further contributes insights into some issues related to end users of the crisis management
systems deployed during the SARS outbreak in Singapore. Data formats and user interfaces
are critical issues since end users would prefer simpler input interfaces and its complexity may
affect data quality, a critical issue in any information system.
This research aims to provide a descriptive case presentation of the role of an
information system in Singapore’s management of the SARS crisis. Such a case study research
should be of interest to e-government researchers and crisis management researchers. Egovernment researchers may consider the implications of using e-government infrastructure
for multiple purposes and the implications for deploying IT capabilities. Crisis management
researchers may be interested in the potential that e-governments hold for crisis management
and the rapid deployment of technology by Singapore’s government. To IS and IT
practitioners, this research presents an insight into extensive technology use in the face of a
crisis, and the advantage of an integrated long term approach towards its management.
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transactional capabilities (e.g. Devadoss, Pan
and Huang 2003), earning itself second place
in global e-government rankings (Accenture
2003).

discussing future research possibilities and
presenting final conclusions.

The extensive use of information
technologies
also
covers
healthcare
information systems that cater to several
strategic needs (Liang 2002). The severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS), in particular,
posed new demands in managing information.
The SARS outbreak affected several countries
around the world from China to Canada in
several ways. The spread of the infection was
seen as a threat to public healthcare, as well as
to economic activities of the regions (e.g.
Chien and Law 2003).

Case study research is most appropriate
in scenarios where the research question is
exploratory in nature and focuses on the
examination of contemporary events that occur
beyond the control of the investigator (Yin
1994). Qualitative research emphasizes the
processes and meanings that are not easily
quantified. It stresses how social experiences
are created and given meaning (Denzin and
Lincoln 1994). Interpretive methods of
research are “aimed at producing an
understanding of the context of the
information and the process whereby the
information system influences and is
influenced by the context” (Walsham 1993).
Hence an interpretive case study methodology
has been adopted for this study, to obtain
insights into the activities during the
management of the crisis. Further, Klein and
Myers (1999) discuss principles of interpretive
research, which help researchers understand
the importance of the interpretive technique in
applying the global context of the case study to
its parts and present an insight into our
understanding of the events.

Singapore managed the emergency
effectively, deploying considerable resources
from several agencies. These agencies were
coordinated
through
its
e-government
infrastructure
and
rapidly
developed
information systems to handle crucial
communication and data exchange which were
necessary during the crisis (Kun and Bray
2002). Post SARS outbreak, these systems
have now become part of public crisis
management tools to monitor or even predict
epidemics or bio-terrorist threats through an
early warning system (Straits Times 2004).
Singapore’s successful experiences thus
raise two interesting research questions that
guide discussions in this paper: “What was the
role of e-government infrastructure in
managing the national healthcare crisis?” and
“What were the key challenges in managing
this crisis that were addressed through
information systems?” In this paper we discuss
in detail how Singapore leveraged its egovernment infrastructure to manage the
SARS crisis quickly and efficiently. These
discussions are grounded through a descriptive
case study. In the next section, we present a
discussion of our case study and data
collection methodology. We then present a
brief overview of Singapore’s e-government
initiatives and the scope of our study to
provide an understanding of the context for
our case discussion. The presentation of the
case is followed by a discussion of the
implications for e-governments and crisis
management, with three key lessons from this
research. We conclude this paper by

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The case study was conducted during
the period of August to October, 2003. Data
triangulation method (Stake 1994) was used in
data collection to help verify occurrence of
events (Yin 1994). Primarily, 20 personal
interviews were conducted to obtain a breadth
of information, opinion and experience
(Fontana and Frey 1994). The researchers
visited the DSTA offices to conduct interviews
with the interviewees. Data collected during
personal interviews focused on understanding
participants’
role,
their
contribution,
experiences and perceptions. Each interview
lasted an hour and an half, approximately. All
interviews were taped with the participants’
permission and transcribed. The transcribed
interview was filed together with notes and
comments made by the researcher. The
interviews were focused, unstructured and
exploratory in nature, to elicit detailed
information from the users on a breath of
issues related to the case. The participant’s
perceptions, experiences and opinions on the
events they witnessed during the crisis were
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predominantly the content of such interviews.
Due to extensive coverage of the outbreak in
Singapore, abundant secondary data were
collated to triangulate the information.
Secondary data included press releases from a
host of organizations involved in the SARS
crisis management, reports on events,
newspaper reports on events, and daily
situation reports from participants. The
secondary data helped in constructing an
outline of the events in Singapore during the
crisis and in verifying recollections. The data
gathered from this case study was open coded
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The coded data
were then grouped into themes and sub-themes.
Three major themes emerged from the analysis,
which relate to e-government, unique issues to
the SARS crisis management and end user
related issues.
The interviewees were from the
Defence Science and Technology Agency
(DSTA) who handled the technology issues
during the crisis and coordinated with all other
agencies and users. The Defence Science and
Technology Agency was formed by the
Government of Singapore as a Statutory Board
under the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) in
March 2000. Apart from defence technology
support, DSTA’s development work in IT
involves various applications with expertise in
providing enterprise systems solutions,
knowledge engineering, mobility, military
command and control and e-government
systems (Devadoss, Pan and Huang 2003). The
participants interviewed consisted of the CIO,
managers, project managers, developers and
users. The interviewees were involved in the
planning, design, implementation and use of
the CMS during the outbreak. The
interviewees were selected for their knowledge
in the process of deciding the system design,
development and implementation during the
crisis. The CMS is currently developed and
managed by another agency for the
Government of Singapore.

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
E-government in Singapore
Singapore is one of the early adopters
of information technology. In implementing its
policies towards becoming a hub for electronic
commerce, Singapore readily re-engineers its
processes to optimize them for efficiency. A
28

clear plan for the development of
infrastructural facilities has enabled it to be
rated second only to Canada in e-government
efforts (Accenture 2003). An innovator, leader
and early adopter of technology, Singapore
earned its place through implementing about
1600 initiatives under the e-government
banner.
Through the eighties, Singapore
deployed information technologies at its
agencies to support its business activities. The
‘IT 2000’ master plan guided its policies on
electronic transactions during the nineties,
among other computerization plans. Through
this period, Singapore established interactive
services for business and citizen services.
Through its E-government Action Plan,
several services were delivered electronically
with a ‘customer-centric’ focus. These services
were then consolidated to be delivered as
integrated services where possible. The new Egovernment Action Plan proposes delivering
greater consolidated services to present a
seamless, always available government to its
citizens.
In summary, Singapore’s e-government
action plan focuses on developing an IT
infrastructure to enable delivery of electronic
services. Such services present a “One
government” vision to its citizens. In the
process, Singapore has not shied from
experimenting with new technologies thus
developing extensive IT capabilities.
Crisis Management
In the context of its emergency
response planning, Singapore had not
developed information architecture to respond
to such a healthcare crisis. The National
Environment Agency (NEA) had a business
process to manage a crisis, but limited
technical infrastructure in the form of
spreadsheet based information management.
When the crisis struck, NEA automatically
became the agency to coordinate information
though Ministry of Health (MOH) was
directing the operations due to the health
related nature of this crisis. Spreadsheet based
data management was not sufficient to meet
the needs of the SARS outbreak. Despite being
the first sector to exploit broadband
technology from 1996, Singapore’s healthcare
sector has largely focused on patient
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healthcare costs through strategic use of
technology and data exchange among the
research networks (Liang 2002). In other
words, there was a shortcoming in the crisis
management readiness in Singapore.

data requirements, business processes for
tracing operations, technical support, design
and development, and advice on upgrading
technology infrastructure in some crisis related
agencies.

Thus, Singapore’s e-government focus
on interactive electronic services was not yet
in place among the healthcare services
(Healthcare community networks for efficient
patient information exchange were only
recently launched in 2004 in Singapore).
Further, the crisis highlighted shortcomings in
crisis management preparation in Singapore.
Among the hospitals, standard operating
procedures in the event of a medical
emergency at this scale were not available.

In this research, we explore the role of
leveraging
e-government
infrastructures
towards the development of a crisis
management tool through DSTA’s experiences
in providing such support during the SARS
outbreak in Singapore. Consistent with our
research questions, DSTA contributed in the
key areas of developing a system that
leveraged e-government infrastructure and
addressed several issues in the process which
are elaborated in the following section.
Following the case description, we discuss
some key lessons from the case study.

This experience thus highlighted the
need
to
develop
Singapore’s
crisis
management, and motivated the long term
planning that was evident in the management
of the crisis. In the following section, we
present a description of the case, tracing the
circumstances leading to the development and
implementation of crisis management system.
Scope of this Study
Singapore’s response to the outbreak of
the crisis involved a host of activities. In the
short term, Singapore attempted to contain the
spread of the infection through efficient
management of the strategy to identify and
isolate infected patients or vulnerable people
who came in contact with such patients. A
number of other initiatives were pursued to
complement the management of the outbreak
such as a dedicated television channel with
SARS related information, video-conferencing
at hospitals for visitors and patients (to avoid
direct contact), developing a non-contact based
fever detection system (using infrared
temperature detectors) etc. In this case study
we report one important part of Singapore’s
crisis management. A significant part of
managing the outbreak was to identify and
isolate potential virus carriers. CMS was
developed to assist in this process.
The DSTA provided technology
support to the crisis managers when the
magnitude of contact tracing operations
needed to be scaled up. The CIO and managers
from DSTA advised the crisis managers on
various technical issues. Such issues included
the need and structure of information systems,

SARS OUTBREAK IN SINGAPORE
SARS in Singapore
In February 2003, several people were
diagnosed with a severe form of pneumonia in
the Guangdong province of China. On the 12th
of March 2003, the World Health Organization
(WHO) issued a global alert on the outbreak of
a severe form of pneumonia. Following the
alert, Singapore’s Ministry of Health (MOH)
issued a national alert, requesting doctors to be
on the look out for flu like symptoms and
respiratory problems in patients. The disease,
named SARS by WHO, spread by close
contact and was an airborne virus. During the
early days, identifying and isolating infected
patients was considered the best course of
action to contain the spread of the virus.
Contacts with every patient had to be traced
and suspected carriers were quarantined at
their homes to monitor their health status over
the 10 day incubation period of the virus.
Soon more cases of the disease surfaced.
Contact tracing became increasingly difficult
with the growing number of index cases
(primary carriers who infect others). On the
19th of April a new cluster of infections was
discovered, which meant an entire wholesale
market had to be shutdown and over seven
hundred people were contacted to check for
symptoms. Some infected patients had visited
several General Practitioners and Sinsehs
(Doctors in Chinese Medicine) before visiting
a hospital.
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Airports were monitored to help screen
passengers as they arrived in Singapore. The
Immigration and Checkpoint Authority (ICA)
worked in conjunction with the National
Environment Agency (NEA) to trace
passengers who needed to be quarantined,
such as in the case of the 4th index patient who
flew into Singapore with symptoms of SARS.
The Ministry of Education (MOE) was
working with the educational institutions to
help trace contacts within educational
institutions and implement screening measures
to identify flu-like symptoms early.

cases, their contacts and issuing the HQO
involved at least four major agencies, namely,
MOH, hospitals, NEA and CISCO.

Tracing Contacts

MOH contacted MINDEF on the 24th of
April 2003, after the wholesale market
incident (where an entire wholesale market
had to be shutdown since an employee there
was diagnosed with SARS), to set up a bigger
operations room for contact tracing operations.
DSTA prepared an operations room with 120
stations within 48 hours. Each station was
equipped with email (through the Government
Electronic Mail System), file and print
services and internet connectivity. Video
conferencing became a critical and useful tool
to link these agencies. The capacity was
subsequently increased to 250. A technical
support team operated in shifts at the operation
centre.

Information was passed on to the
contact tracing operations centre, when a
patient was identified as a suspected SARS
case. The MOH did its own follow up and
sometimes obtained information from other
relevant agencies. For example, MOE
provided some information on a student’s
school, etc. The information was consolidated
and sent to the operations centre, which traced
contacts. A list of people to be issued with an
HQO (Home Quarantine Order) was then
delivered to CISCO. MOH contracted CISCO,
a statutory board specializing in security
services in Singapore, to help in issuing and
verifying compliance of an HQO by 8pm
everyday. CISCO’s staff then traced people in
their list and issued an HQO. An Internet
enabled camera was connected and social
support provided through various agencies
such as counselling, food delivery etc. Thus,
the complete process of identifying suspect

This procedure had to be completed by
midnight or early morning in order to ensure
immediate compliance with the HQO. Nonissuance or non-compliance only meant a
potential increase in the number of people to
be traced. “We found CISCO’s staff doing
detective work trying to locate residents,
because information given to them was often
incorrect and it meant backlog”, noted a
manager.

The CIO of DSTA oversaw the
operations
and
suggested
that
the
infrastructure would still not help MOH scale
its operations because its business process was
not sufficiently streamlined. “Most of the
information was in hardcopies or on
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Figure 1. The spread of SARS infection in Singapore
(adapted from data available at http://www.moh.gov.sg)
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spreadsheets with unstructured data. It would
be hard to do any sort of analysis based on that
data” he said. DSTA recommended developing
an information system to cater to information
co-ordination and flow. “We wanted to build
something that can help in responding to
emergencies and can be further developed
later”, said the CIO.
Developing a Case Management System
DSTA targeted two weeks to gather
requirements and develop. It began by
assembling a team that was experienced in
network technologies, database administration,
systems development, and testing. Employees
were invited to join the development team, and
asked to drop all existing projects to complete
the CMS (Case Management System) in two
weeks. Most of the invited employees began
work immediately, motivated by the crisis.
Another reason cited by the developers was
the challenge of having to develop a system in
such a short time, and gathering development
requirements as the system was being written.
“It was like being in some kind of extreme
programming competition!” suggested a
programmer.
DSTA previously developed a casualty
management system for the Singapore Armed
Forces. The project managers had prior
experience in developing this system and used
it as a starting point. The developers chose
Microsoft WindowsTM since it took only a
short time to deliver fully licensed servers to
the operations centre, with MSSQLTM as the
backend database. To help understand linkages
among infected patients and trace contacts,
another government agency provided DSTA
with software to study cross-relationships
among a given set of people.
There were no established procedures
in the operations room, since data management
up to now had been through spreadsheets and
individual practices to monitor and manage
tracing operations. “People at the operation
centre had no time to talk to us, they would
give us the data and we had to figure out the
details. Sometimes they didn’t know the
complete process!” said a manager. The team
coaxed information from the users, talking to
them when possible and identified data sources,
formats, security, and reports. Figure 2

represents information sources for contact
tracing operations.
System requirements changed on a
daily or even hourly basis. An example is
categories of potential SARS cases. There
were initially four, which were later revised to
eight different categories. “Even as we hard
coded the categories, the classification
changed, so we later made it a configurable
option”, said a programmer. “Sometimes we’d
make some changes on site, but forget to put
those changes back into the development
repository”, reported another programmer.
Hospitals were an important zone in the
battle against SARS. Every time a patient was
identified as a SARS patient, contact tracing
had to be carried out within the hospital to
trace the movement of the patient and monitor
the health of relevant staff and in-mates, often
“taking two days”, according to a doctor. This
was a critical but time consuming process and
data was often incomplete. The hospital staff,
with their limited technical expertise innovated
through the use of Microsoft VisioTM to plot
the linkages to other contacts. Technology
savvy doctors helped establish initial contact
tracing data systems with spreadsheets to help
trace patients and their contacts. These
spreadsheets were emailed to MOH. When
DSTA was invited to help, a meeting with the
CIO’s of all health sector agencies was held.
This led to trying a system to help tag patients
at Accident and Emergency (A&E)
departments of the hospitals. “Using RFID
(Radio Frequency Identification) made it easy
to list contacts instantaneously” said a
manager. However, the RFID system was
deployed only on a trial basis at one hospital
during the crisis and later extended to other
hospitals. The data was stored in a separate
database, and not linked to CMS. With a
structured database, information was easy to
retrieve when needed, which was the objective
of the trials.
Design of Case Management System
The CMS was designed to cater to the
immediate needs of managing the SARS
outbreak, with a view towards providing a
long term solution to similar crises. The
frequent outbreaks of bird flu virus in other
regions, possibilities of new virus forms and
even a recurrence of SARS outbreaks are
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realistic possibilities that the team attempted to
cater to through the CMS. Sources of
information for such a system ranged from
hospitals, Ministry of Education (MOE), and
MOH to General Practitioner Doctors and
Traditional
Chinese
Medicine
(TCM)
practitioners. Information from all sources had
to be collected into a database from where the
system would perform case management
should someone be identified as a suspected or
confirmed SARS patient. Link Analysis
connected confirmed cases with suspected and
probable cases, to identify potential SARS
patients and monitor their health status. This
SARS database could also be used to provide
exit control with the immigration authorities
(as a commitment to regional safety) or with
MOE to isolate students who inadvertently
attend schools when they should be
quarantined. The databases together were
interfaced through the CMS and a Link
Analysis system.
A reference database was created with
simple contact information of as much of the
population as was possible to help contact
people quickly. This database was ineffective

with no data to look up contact information. “I
was told it might be impossible to gather such
data, but I approached various government
CIO’s anyway, and they agreed. When one
agency offered its data (subject to clearance by
the Ministry), they cautioned me that it was at
least 3 months old. But I was ecstatic because
back then I had no data and any data was
better than that!” said the CIO. The reference
database is highly sensitive with contact
information for a high percentage of the
population. “It is not a free for all as far as data
is concerned. We have norms to conform to in
handling such data” reported the CIO. All data
exchange is guided by government policies to
protect the privacy of individuals. Data access
in the system is tiered into multiple layers and
access to tiers controlled by levels of authority.
The case data in CMS focused on
patient information, infection status and
relation to other patients or contacts. This
information helped the managers develop a
clearer understanding of the spread of the
infection. It also gave the managers the ability
to identify and contact potential people at risk
through its linkage to the reference database.

Figure 2. Information Management Needs that were identified for CMS
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Within the CMS, due to often recurring
inaccuracies in the NRIC (National
Registration Identity Card) numbers of the
residents, the records were indexed on unique
numbers generated by the CMS. This reduced
reliance on the NRIC numbers to identify
users. “Often the registered address may not
match with the actual contact address because
people move. So we had to rely on our own
indexing numbers for records, as well as rely
on mobile phone numbers to contact people
rather than land lines”, reported a manager.
High mobile phone penetration in Singapore
made using mobile phones to contact people
easier than using fixed phones in many cases.
Figure 3 is a screen capture of the new case
creation in the CMS.
Access to the system was limited to the
operations room for the crisis management and
the data management group at the MOH. Data
from other agencies were received by the
operations centre via email, and keyed in by its
staff. This strategy reduced the need for
extensive training across several agencies.
Through a unified data entry system into the
database, monitoring the status of the infection
across the nation became feasible. The data
from the CMS system were used to generate
reports that gave the government an accurate
update on the status of infections across the
nation, including the quarantine numbers and
their status. Further, daily press briefings were
held during the crisis period, when situation
reports were needed. This status report was
delivered everyday through the press
conference by the Minister for Health. CMS
simplified the process of compiling such
reports, handed out daily by the MOH.
Thus, CMS made it possible to
efficiently assemble accurate status reports.
Reports generated from the system on the
status of the crisis were communicated back to
the hospitals and other agencies. The numbers
of new infections were dwindling in Singapore
by the time CMS was fully operational. Within
a month of CMS’ deployment, Singapore was
declared clear of SARS virus by the WHO.
Implementing CMS
The operations centre staffed by NEA’s
officers had developed their own data formats
on spreadsheets. In addition they used
spreadsheets forwarded by other agencies,

which in turn were formatted as they saw fit.
Thus with “virtually 200 different formats to
resolve, data conversion was a difficult
process” according to the project manager.
The database team set about resolving these
issues and populated CMS with the case data.
DSTA set some members of its team the task
of converting the data. “It was a tedious
process, and we spent long hours trying to
reconcile it to the new system” added a user
involved in the conversion process. Another
user commented that “this was perhaps the
most complex part of entire implementation
process because there was no structure to the
data used in its spreadsheets”.
The team worked on parallel
implementation to ease the system in while
converting data and training users during their
breaks. The data input was through a web
interface. “We kept the web interface as
simple as we could, but some users thought
spreadsheets were better because there were no
restrictions in entering data” said the project
manager. After intensive system testing, the
operations centre switched over to CMS.
DSTA then handed the system to MOH,
satisfied with its stability. Following the
containment of the SARS outbreak in
Singapore, MOH contracted another agency to
continue maintenance and development in
accordance with its own procedures. Further
development of these systems are planned, but
are not finalized at the moment.
On the 30th of May 2003, Singapore
was declared clear of the SARS virus by WHO.
On the 9th of September 2003, a new probable
SARS case was reported in Singapore. A postdoctoral student was infected while handling
virus samples in a laboratory and visited
doctors several times with persistent fever.
Within 8 hours of having identified a probable
SARS patient and activating tracing operations,
about 60 people were traced and contacted and
some were issued HQO’s. The CIO reported:
“I wasn’t called to support, which means our
system is working satisfactorily!”
Discussion & Implications
The SARS outbreak was a difficult
challenge to Singapore, particularly in the
context of the global economic slowdown.
Hence effective and efficient action was
necessary to manage the outbreak. E-
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Figure 3: Screen Image of the Creating a Case on Case Management System
government infrastructure was used as a
suitable platform, but not as a solution in itself
(Nadler and Tushman 1997). It helped
coordinate processes across several agencies
and manage information. In this section, we
discuss the importance of these experiences in
the context of leveraging e-government
infrastructure. We also explore some important
directions for future research.
E-government Infrastructure: Platform for
Crisis Management
Governments are adopting information
technologies to provide integrated services to
citizens (Ho 2002). This is a difficult task
considering the bureaucratic nature of
governments (Bretschneider 1990). However,
increased adoption of technology has forced
34

governments towards accepting a citizen
perspective, abandoning their administration
friendly approach (Lenk and Traunmuller
2000). This shift has also been due to
pressures to leverage existing IT investments
and derive greater value (Bannister 2001).
Further, advanced e-government programs
progress towards more integrated services
(Moon 2002; Layne and Lee 2001).
Infrastructure and integration are two
important aspects of e-government. These two
aspects of e-government support telecooperation (Wimmer and Traunmuller 2001)
to deliver integrated services (Wimmer and
Traunmuller 2001; Devadoss, Pan and Huang
2003).
Integration and infrastructure also
benefit crisis management in many ways. The
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primary objective in any crisis is to give
relevant agencies a collaborative system to
share knowledge (Turoff 2002), and enable
communication and data exchange (Kun and
Bray 2002). During the outbreak, the contact
tracing operations centre for 110 stations was
established within 48 hours and connected to
the government network. Government email
systems were used to enable instant
communication channels between various
sources of data and the operations centre.
A complete information system was
developed in 11 days to manage information
related to the emergency, three days ahead of
the scheduled two weeks. Organizations
exchanged data securely, through government
email systems, to help contact tracing
operations. This was enabled by extensive eservices that possessed updated contact
information, helping to quickly contain the
spread of the SARS virus. For example, one
government agency maintained updated
employment contact information for some of
their electronic services. Members’ contact
information was considered accurate due to the
nature of their services. This government
electronic service database was a big boost to
the CMS since it instantly gave accurate
contact information to a large number of
residents in Singapore. However, such data
was not freely available to other government
agencies and the government of Singapore
specifically approved such a use by CMS
under special circumstances.
In summary, the crisis management
tools relied on the e-government infrastructure
to operate, and used data from e-government
services shared by respective agencies. The
development of CMS and its circumstances
has prompted establishing crisis management
tools that can cater to such needs in the future,
such as an early warning system monitoring
some symptoms at clinics (Straits Times 2004).
Particularly in the context of bio-terrorist
threats or even the recurrence of SARS or
other epidemics, appropriate information
infrastructures could serve these dual purposes
(Kun and Bray 2002). E-government provides
suitable platforms for development of such
information infrastructures because of their
extensive reach and variety of electronic
databases.

Leveraging
e-government
infrastructures and capabilities however, is not
an automatic process as demonstrated in this
case. In Singapore, there was no prior
experience or procedures and the government
had to adapt to evolving conditions. While
planning provides for some responses in the
event of a crisis, a crisis may also pose entirely
new situations that may need new solutions
and approaches. In the next section, we discuss
how SARS posed new demands and
Singapore’s response to the same.
Crisis Management: New Demands from
SARS Experiences
Advanced applications of technology
within e-governments have also centred on
vertical and horizontal integration in order to
provide more integrated services to citizens
(Moon 2002). A significant benefit of
information technologies is the ability to
implement changes through windows of
opportunities (Tyre and Orlikowski 1994).
This is particularly true during a crisis, since
every crisis is unique and presents an
opportunity to prepare for new eventualities in
the future. In this context, a common
infrastructure would be necessary to manage a
variety of crises such as bio-terrorism or
natural disasters for example (Arens and
Rosenbloom 2003). Thus, leveraging IT
capabilities,
identifying,
creating
and
responding to changes quickly become
relevant to e-governments in this respect.
Problems in data accuracy, collation of data
from a variety of sources, effective sharing of
such data and management of crisis data for
better analysis are important new issues that
the system had to cater to from Singapore
experiences. Further, these important issues
were addressed with an eye on the long-term
feasibility of their solutions.
In managing SARS, the primary lesson
is the realization of a need to exchange
accurate information quickly and efficiently
across several agencies. CMS was deployed
for this purpose. Channels of communication
were immediately opened with several sources
of data, such as hospitals, MOH, NEA and
CISCO, who were actively involved in
collection and using the data related to the
SARS outbreak. During the early days of
SARS in Singapore, data inconsistency,
variety of formats in exchanging data,
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inaccuracies and even lack of data caused a
significant slowdown in the contact tracing
operations. The deployment of CMS was
aimed at addressing such issues in data
management.
However, the CMS was insufficient to
detect a possible outbreak of the symptoms of
the disease in Singapore. CMS was not sensing
data from the sources that could enable such
functionality. This was addressed through an
early warning system (Straits Times 2004) that
is now being tried in a few clinics to capture
and analyze the outbreak of some key
symptoms in regions across the country. The
need for an operations room was another
outcome of the experiences of SARS
management. An equipped operations centre is
now on standby, ready to swing into action
within a couple of hours. Hospitals and
organizations dealing with large gatherings are
also preparing standard operating procedures
to deal with crisis situations. In addition,
Singapore also experimented with RFID
(Radio Frequency Identification) to tag
patients at emergency wards to improve the
accuracy of its data during contact tracing.
Also, several government agencies contributed
data to the development of an effective system
in managing the SARS crisis. The availability
of a variety of data sources was an advantage
in the effectiveness of the CMS in Singapore.
Such an ability to identify and gather relevant
data from a variety of sources was enabled
through an effective use of the e-government
infrastructure. Further, DSTA took great care
in ensuring secure access and availability of
such data during management of the crisis.
Singapore’s experiences in focussing
on ensuring accurate data collection and
communication across agencies, relying on
other services for initial data requirements and
deploying its capabilities to deliver such
functionality holds interesting implications for
crisis management in general. With increasing
investment in e-government infrastructures
around the world, the development of such
experiences and systems as capabilities which
can be leveraged for new demands is an
important
lesson.
Their
information
management capabilities provide governments
the opportunity to efficiently collate accurate
data on the crisis, which is an important part of
managing the crisis.
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Systems Users: Adapting to Structured
Data Exchange
As is often during a crisis, users work
long shifts trying to ease the situation, and
have little time to learn new systems (Turoff
2002). Hence, the choice of an appropriate
interface is important. However, the quality of
data gathered and entered into the system is
also important. The web browser is often the
preferred interface due to its popularity,
familiarity, and simplicity (Milford 2000).
Managing SARS provided useful insights into
user behaviour towards data handling at times
of crisis.
Singapore’s high technology adoption
was visible with several distributed users
relying on spreadsheets and charting software
to represent and exchange data during the
crisis. However, such applications were
unstructured data sharing mechanisms, and
users had a strong preference towards
unstructured data entry. Users familiar with
spreadsheets queried if they could see all the
data at once instead of a case-by-case view as
designed in the CMS. “They wanted to see all
the data at once as in the spreadsheet, and did
not want to click here and there for different
views.” reported the CIO.
Their preference for unstructured data
could be attributed to the uncertainty as to the
relevance and need for information gathered
and any data was considered better during the
early days of the crisis. This notion was
challenged with the arrival of CMS, and users
had to learn to structure their data input and
obtain
more
meaningful
inputs
to
systematically track case data. “Some of the
early data was just ‘Uncle One’ or ‘Aunty
One’ making it impossible to do anything
useful with it” added another manager.
Further, unique identity numbers of the
residents of Singapore was often unavailable
or incomplete. To tackle this, CMS included a
unique indexing system for its case
management. Data repetition was checked
through a matching of name and identity
numbers where available. Thus data cleaning
was done mostly prior to data entry into the
system.
Another impact of the system change
was in training the users. CMS was a webbased system, designed to simplify data
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presentation and provide a familiar interface to
users. Older users were not comfortable with
the interface and preferred a spreadsheet
layout that could be scrolled to input any
information at any point. Training was
necessary to help older users adapt to the new
systems, where information was in one
window and navigated through links. The
younger army recruits, who also manned a
portion of the operations room, reported the
interface “familiar and easy to use”.
These experiences highlight the variety
of expectations from users. The use of a web
based system simplifies familiarity problems
with most users, due to the popularity of the
internet. However, some users may still need
more training in using such systems. Further,
processing data prior to entry to the system is
necessary due to the wide variety of sources
that provide data for the system. This could be
simplified in the continuing development of
the system to enable decentralized data entry
into the shared system. Also, in handling data
from a number of sources, the common
problem is the variety of formats that users
tend to use, particularly in the absence of a
common input standard. This problem is
compounded by the use of spreadsheet systems
which allow users excessive freedom in
formatting their data. The short term solution
in this case was to clean the data prior to data
entry, and the long term solution is to
decentralize data entry into the system at the
source of the data itself.

FUTURE RESEARCH
In our case study, we discussed the
possibilities
of leveraging
extensively
available IT infrastructure for crisis
management. Crisis management can benefit
from such systems through rapid deployment
of systems, and wider reach through access to
data from a variety of sources. All such issues
contribute towards an effective management of
a crisis. To gain further insights into such
issues, it would be of interest to study the data
exchange formats across several systems and
the possibilities of capturing some data
routinely, as part of crisis management
planning. With increased availability and use
of ubiquitous technologies such as RFID, it
would be of interest to explore the role of data

integration on the fly and the resulting security
and privacy issues during crisis management.
Singapore has now developed an early
warning system, connected to data related to
some polyclinics. The role of such early
warning systems, which attempt to identify
appearance of potential infections, is another
area of interest in preventing large scale spread
of new diseases. Future research should focus
on the ability to gather and synthesize such
data into meaning indicators of potential
threats
through
existing
information
infrastructures. Through our research, we have
attempted to contribute towards further
development of these important research areas.
Knowledge of such issues is important in the
context of potential threats that the world faces
today.

CONCLUSION
E-governments are growing towards
greater vertical and horizontal integration of
services (Moon 2002). By studying the
management of the SARS viral outbreak in
Singapore, we illustrate the use of egovernment
infrastructures
towards
developing crisis management tools. Crisis
management needs many applications to cater
to information needs (Kun and Bray 2002),
and Singapore’s experiences suggest that egovernment provides a suitable platform for
deploying these systems. E-government
infrastructure’s reach into governments can
provide the common infrastructures that crisis
management needs (Arens and Rosenbloom
2003).
A closer examination of the case
reveals two interesting aspects of user
behaviour and system functionality. Though egovernments can deliver new functionality for
any crisis through their IT infrastructure and
capabilities, the SARS crisis highlighted the
need for development of contact databases and
systematic management of individual cases
leading to accurate nationwide data. The focus
was to get data input as accurate as possible
and share it effectively across multiple
organizations. Users’ interaction with the
system revealed the advantage of simple
browser interfaces, and the need for training
despite its popularity. Crisis managers need to
train users despite the time constraints during a
crisis (Turoff 2002).
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WHO has warned that the SARS virus
is possibly only the first of several health
scares. It is thus essential that governments
focus on managing such health crises and
develop an infrastructure to manage similar
threats such as bio-terrorism (Kun and Bray
2002; Turoff 2002; Arens and Rosenbloom
2003). Through a discussion of Singapore’s
experiences we highlight some directions for
crisis managers in the form leveraging egovernment infrastructures, managing new
functionalities and user interactions. While the
discussions are grounded in Singapore’s
experiences, these lessons are also useful in
developing our knowledge in effectively
managing crises. Singapore has now

institutionalised these systems and hopes to be
fully ready to tackle a recurrence of SARS
within 2 hours, as well as use these
experiences as baseline for new crises.
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APPENDIX A – LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CISCO - A statutory board specializing in
security services in Singapore
CIO – Chief Information Officer
CMS – Case Management System
DSTA – Defence Science and Technology
Agency
HQO – Home Quarantine Order
ICA – Immigration and Checkpoint Authority

MOE – Ministry of Education
MOH – Ministry of Health
NEA – National Environment Agency
NRIC – National Registration Identity Card
SARS – Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
TCM – Traditional Chinese Medicine
WHO – World Health Organization

MINDEF – Ministry of Defence
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